How to Get Away with Murder:  the “Gay Panic” Defense by Russo, Omar T.
Touro Law Review 
Volume 35 Number 2 Article 9 
2019 
How to Get Away with Murder: the “Gay Panic” Defense 
Omar T. Russo 
Touro Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law 
Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Human Rights Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Russo, Omar T. (2019) "How to Get Away with Murder: the “Gay Panic” Defense," Touro Law Review: Vol. 
35 : No. 2 , Article 9. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol35/iss2/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For 
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu. 
 
811 
HOW TO GET AWAY WITH MURDER:  
THE “GAY PANIC” DEFENSE 
Omar T. Russo* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In April of 2018, a jury found 69-year-old James Miller of 
Austin, Texas not guilty of murder for the 2015 slaying of his neighbor, 
Daniel Spencer.1  The jury convicted Miller of criminally negligent 
homicide, a crime that earned him a mere six months in jail followed 
by ten years of probation.2  During the night, Miller had invited 
Spencer, his 32-year-old neighbor, to his house where they drank and 
listened to music; the two were musicians.3  Miller claims that he 
rejected a kiss from Spencer and that Miller stabbed Spencer in a 
panic.4 
Miller’s defense counsel argued that he acted in self-defense, 
in a manner known unofficially as the “gay panic defense.”5  The “gay 
 
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Touro Law Center; Bachelor of Arts, Political Science, Hartwick 
College, Oneonta, New York.  I would like to first thank Professor Meredith Miller for her 
patience and guidance in bringing this work to fruition, as well as Madeleine Laser, Notes 
Editor, for her consistency, direction and encouragement through this process.  I thank my 
mother and family for their support and curiosity, which inspired continued dedication to the 
topic.  Finally, I would like to thank Ali and Aaron Goldsmith, who always inspire me, and 
who represent the very best of the legal profession and its core values of service, advocacy, 
and decency.  I humbly dedicate this work to the immeasurable number of LGBT folks around 
the world who have suffered unthinkable injustice, fear, hate and violence in their everyday 
lives; and to the pioneers at Stonewall who risked it all. 
1 Jackie Salo, Man Who Used ‘Gay Panic’ Defense for Killing Neighbor Avoids Prison, 
N.Y. POST (Apr. 27, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/04/27/man-who-used-gay-panic-defense-
for-killing-neighbor-avoids-prison/. 
2 Id. 
3 Cleve R. Wootson, Jr., A Former Police Employee Said He Killed a Man in ‘a Gay Panic’ 





5 A.B.A. RES. 113A, at 6 (2013), https://lgbtbar.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/6/2014/02/Ga 
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panic” defense stems from a phenomenon originally coined by 
psychotherapist Edward J. Kempf in 1920, who claimed that, in his 
studies of heterosexual-identifying males, they became agitated, 
enraged and panicked by their acute homosexual thoughts or ideas.6  
The psychological concerns described by Kempf were not out of touch 
with the times, given the classification of “homosexuality” as a 
medically-recognized disorder until 1973.7  
Today, the gay panic defense is still used to influence jurors to 
mitigate a violent defendant’s conviction or sentence based on the 
premise that an individual of the same sex had a romantic interest in 
the defendant, which consequently, struck some panic within the 
defendant and caused the defendant to react violently.8  The defense is 
based upon “homophobia and transphobia, and send[s] the wrong 
message that violence against LGBT people is acceptable.”9 
In an era post-pathological homosexuality, cases such as the 
Texas murder of Daniel Spencer effectively move the focus from the 
defendant to the victim.10  The defense puts the victim under a 
 
y-and-Trans-Panic-Defenses-Resolution.pdf.  What will be referred to as the gay panic defense 
throughout this Note actually encompasses both that and the trans panic defense, in which 
similar justification is offered for crimes resulting in the discovery or assumption of a victim’s 
gender identity.  “Gay panic defense” itself, for the purposes of the Note, will serve as an 
umbrella term comprising the two phenomena. 
6 EDWARD J. KEMPF, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 477 (1920), https://archive.org/details/390020863 
48753.med.yale.edu.  For the purposes of this Note, the word “homosexual” will be used 
scarcely to refer to the intimacy between two same-sex partners or their sexual orientation.  
The word today exists with undertones of hate and prejudice that linger from the days of 
Kempf, in which such intimacy was viewed as a legitimate medical condition.  In describing 
marriage, intimacy or relationship, “[s]ubstitute the word ‘gay’ . . . and the terms suddenly 
become far less loaded, so that the ring of disapproval and judgement evaporates.”  Jeremy W. 
Peters, The Decline and Fall of the ‘H’ Word, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/fashion/gays-lesbians-the-term-homosexual.html.  For 
the purposes of this Note, the terms LGBT, gay or trans will be used in place of the word 
homosexual, often, if not always in reference to the broader lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
community. “LGBT” will be used to describe the broader community of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and queer-identifying individuals.  The word transgender is commonly understood 
to be an umbrella term encompassing a wide range of gender identities falling outside of the 
binary male and female categories. 
7 Jack Drescher, Out of DSM: Depathologizing Homosexuality, 5 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 565 
(2015), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4695779. 
8 Gay/Trans Panic Defense, LGBT B., https://lgbtbar.org/what-we-do/programs/gay-and-
trans-panic-defense (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
9 JORDAN BLAIR WOODS ET AL., MODEL LEGISLATION FOR ELIMINATING THE GAY AND TRANS 
PANIC DEFENSES 3 (2016), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016-
Model-GayTransPanic-Ban-Laws-final.pdf.  
10 David Alan Perkiss, A New Strategy for Neutralizing the Gay Panic Defense at Trial: 
Lessons From the Lawrence King Case, 60 UCLA L. REV. 778, 797 (2013). 
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microscope regarding his or her identity, rather than placing the 
defendant under the microscope for his or her own conduct.  The jury’s 
attention is effectively taken from the violent act and placed rather on 
who the victim was, and what about the victim could have in some way 
led to this chain of events.  This course of action falls under the 
phenomenon of “victim-blaming,” where attackers (often in sexual 
abuse cases, but not exclusively) assert that a victim has “contributed 
to the causation of her [or his] own rape.”11  Further, victim-blaming 
is not only used within the context of rape; the tactic is similarly 
employed in the context of domestic violence and has allowed for the 
expansion of the gay panic defense.12  As such, in a society struggling 
to deprogram our victim-blaming mentality, the gay panic defense is 
able to flourish. 
In order for the gay panic defense to work the way that it has, 
defendants have had to prove that “the victim’s unwanted, nonviolent 
homosexual advance was characterized as an external stimulus causing 
the defendant’s homicidal reaction.”13  To reach such an assumption, 
one must accept the premise that gays are, in some way, provocative 
by nature or in a position to cause great anxiety and distress that 
triggers one’s sentiment that there exists no reasonable measure other 
than a violent or homicidal outburst. 
The reality is that, throughout our institutions of government, 
LGBT persons are a “politically powerless minority group because 
they are grossly underrepresented in our nation’s legislative bodies.”14  
For decades, the LGBT community has suffered from social isolation 
and damnation as mentally ill.15  Apart from the societal and political 
detriment suffered, members of the LGBT community suffered in 
private, as intimate conduct amongst gays was methodologically 
 
11 Ellen M. Bublick, Citizen No-Duty Rules: Rape Victims and Comparative Fault, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1463 (1999). 
12 Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on 
Wrongful Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims’ Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 647 (2003) 
(discussing victim-blaming in the context of domestic violence criminal prosecutions and that 
“[j]ustification defenses are the most obvious examples of formal victim blaming doctrines in 
criminal law.  The doctrines of self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property base 
justification of an intentional killing exclusively on the victim’s behavior.”). 
13 Perkiss, supra note 10, at 797. 
14 Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs a Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of 
LGBTs as a Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. 
& POL’Y. 385, 385 (2010). 
15 Id. at 385, 390-91. 
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criminalized in our country for most of its existence.16  The notion that 
one’s sexual identity or non-violent romantic gesture prompted 
justifiable murder is cause for great concern, considering what this 
means for victims in our criminal justice system. 
The core issue that this Note seeks to address is that LGBT 
individuals face adversity in our courts in the form of prejudicial 
victim-blaming, having their sexuality or gender orientation used as 
justification for the violent attack perpetrated against him or her.  It is 
well-established that LGBT people in this country face adversity at 
disproportionately high rates in terms of poverty, discrimination and 
violence.17  Specifically, the prevalence of sexual and physical 
violence is significantly higher against LGBTs than their straight 
counterparts.18  The disparity, and pervasive acts of oppression, are 
even greater where intersectionality of identities exists, such as race 
and ethnicity.19  The gay panic defense, as the author will discuss, does 
immeasurable damage to our system of justice by promoting 
oppression against the LGBT community by endangering its already 
insecure fundamental rights.20 
The basis for the gay panic defense is highly troublesome for 
reasons beyond the clear violence concerns; namely, its due process 
implications.  In an era where gay conduct is protected from 
government intervention through some recognition of individuals’ 
rights to privacy in personal sexual conduct, the gay panic defense is 
legally flawed.21  While admittedly the courtroom is a place where 
one’s privacy often takes the back burner in pursuit of justice, it is hard 
to imagine a society in which one’s religion is somehow justification 
for panic-driven murder, or in similar analogy, one’s racial 
background; assuming that logic is sound, how then can the sexual 
orientation or gender identity of an individual, something so 
 
16 Id. 
17 Jordan Blair Woods, LGBT Identity and Crime, 105 CAL. L. REV. 667, 719 (2017). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 719-20 (describing the increased crime rates where an individual falls under either: 
more than one category under the LGBT umbrella or the LGBT umbrella and another 
historically disadvantaged or minority group). 
20 As of 2016, 4.1% of the United States population self-identified to fall somewhere along 
the LGBT spectrum, amounting to approximately 10 million Americans.  Gary J. Gates, In 
U.S., More Adults Identifying as LGBT, GALLUP (Jan. 11, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/ 
201731/lgbt-identification-rises.aspx. 
21 See infra note 75 (discussing the protection of privacy rights enumerated in the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution). 
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fundamental to one’s being and so personal in nature, not violate the 
privacy protections established by the Supreme Court?22   
Contemporarily, a defense of panic, based on arbitrary 
characteristics of another person, is illogical and poorly reflective of 
our current state of law, justice and societal opinion.  The gay panic 
defense continues to perpetuate the inaccurate notion that LGBT 
people trigger fear in others; that an LGBT individual’s unwanted and 
nonviolent romantic advances are justification for violence, or even 
murder.  To bring the issue of a victim’s sexual orientation to focus as 
a defense tactic is “like placing a woman’s sexual promiscuity at issue 
to show consent to rape.”23 
 Essentially, the gay panic defense should be prohibited in all 
courts across the country because victims’ perceived or actual gender 
identities or sexual orientations should not serve as a defense or 
justification for violence.  Trial courts throughout the country must 
recognize the delicate balancing test applied similarly under rape 
shield laws, measuring probative value against undue prejudice, which 
mostly prevents admission of a rape victim’s sexual history.24  While 
some have recognized the use of the gay panic defense, few have 
analyzed the statutory bans enacted in a handful of states, and the 
impact that bans or the defense could realistically have. 
Although only California, Illinois, and Rhode Island have 
passed legislation to proactively ban the defense, similar legislation is 
pending at the federal level and in several states and the District of 
Columbia.25  This Note blends decades of sociological and legal 
transitions, with regard to sexuality and gender, to set forth a 
comprehensive solution to one of the gay rights movement’s 
contemporary struggles: the use of the gay panic defense.  In Section 
II of this Note, the author examines the origin and development of the 
defense.  Section III is devoted to the history of the LGBT community 
in the United States, and how deep-seated prejudice has pervaded the 
 
22 See infra note 75. 
23 Developments in the Law: Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 
1548 n.187 (1989). 
24 As a result of public pressure, “rape shield laws” were passed to encourage women to 
come forward in reporting sexual assaults and “limited the admission of . . . prior sexual 
history [as] evidence at trial. As a result, both the reporting and prosecution of opposite-sex 
rape increased.”  Elizabeth J. Kramer, When Men are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to 
Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 296 (1998) (arguing that rape shield laws, 
historically used to protect female victims on trial against their male abusers, should be used 
to protect male victims from male abusers). 
25 See supra note 8. 
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judicial system and allowed for a defense of this nature to make its way 
into our courts.  Section III continues with an analysis of the country’s 
high-profile LGBT rights cases and how they have changed the shape 
of LGBT bias.  Section IV examines the phenomenon of victim-
blaming and the use of the gay panic defense as another form of that 
dangerous issue.  Section V discusses the current and pending state 
bans on the defense used in criminal proceedings.  The author 
describes how other jurisdictions may enact similar legislation or take 
proactive steps to ban the defense.  Finally, in Section VI, this Note 
concludes with policy recommendations that may provide adequate 
protection of LGBT persons in courts throughout the country. 
II. ORIGINS OF THE GAY PANIC DEFENSE 
The gay panic defense is not a creation of the legislature or the 
courts, which is why it is considered, by most, an “unofficial” defense, 
hidden beneath the surface and used in conjunction with recognized 
legal defenses.26  While the gay panic defense, itself, is unrecognized 
in any jurisdiction in the country, defendants typically inject it as an 
undertone of their defense in typically one of three recognized 
defenses: self-defense, provocation, or diminished capacity/insanity.27   
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”), while not adopted by every 
jurisdiction in the country, is described as the “closest thing to being 
an American criminal code” because it encompasses the general ideas 
of cross-jurisdictional criminal law.28  Self-defense, provocation, and 
diminished capacity/insanity are the main defenses typically available, 
under the MPC, to a criminal defendant charged with homicide. 
Under section 3.04 of the MPC, self-defense is described, in 
relevant part, as: 
the use of force upon or toward another person is 
justifiable when the actor believes that such force is 
immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting 
 
26 See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 475 (2008) 
(describing the unofficial strategy of the defense and that “[t]here is no officially recognized 
‘gay panic’ defense, but many use the term to refer to defense strategies that rely on the notion 
that a criminal defendant should be excused or justified if his violent actions were in response 
to a (homo)sexual advance.”). 
27 A.B.A. RES. 113A, supra note 5, at 1. 
28 Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief 
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319 (2007). 
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himself against the use of unlawful force by such other 
person on the present occasion.29 
The defense is limited in its applicability and, thus, is “not 
justifiable . . . unless the actor believe[s] that such force is necessary 
to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or 
sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat.”30  Similarly, the use 
of such force is further limited when an actor can reasonably retreat by 
engaging in non-violent conduct to escape the circumstances; the 
retreat requirement does not apply, however, when a victim is in his or 
her home.31 
Next, provocation often refers to a murder that was committed 
under extreme emotional disturbance.  The MPC additionally requires 
that the disturbance have a reasonable explanation or excuse.32 The 
MPC provides that criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter, as 
opposed to murder, when the homicide is “committed under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there 
is reasonable explanation or excuse.”33 
Finally, the MPC permits the defense of mental disease or 
defect, which in practice treats the defendant as lacking requisite intent 
or responsibility (insanity or diminished capacity).34  Section 4.01(1) 
of the MPC provides that: 
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at 
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease of 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law.35 
As applied to the gay panic defense, a defendant may claim that 
he acted in self-defense when he foresaw a sexual attempt by the 
victim,  While it is possible that no evidence supports such a claim, or 
even evidence to the contrary, the very exposure of the victim’s 
sexuality through such testimony or extrinsic evidence allows for bias 
to pervade the jury box rather than the merits of the case.  Similarly, a 
 
29 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 2018). 
30 Id. § 3.04(2)(b). 
31 Id. § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(a). 
32 Id. § 210.3(1)(b). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. § 4.01(1). 
35 Id. 
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defendant may assert that he acted under extreme emotional 
disturbance, that his overwhelming fear of the gay victim produced this 
homicidal reaction.  If one accepts the possibility that a juror may share 
a similar sentiment, then it follows that a juror may find gayness to be 
a reasonable explanation or excuse as required under the MPC.  Lastly, 
under the insanity defense, a criminal defendant may assert a lapse of 
capacity to understand or appreciate the severity of his actions, that his 
fear and panic so clouded his judgment that murder no longer held the 
weight it normally would. 
Successful use of the gay panic defense in any form has 
immeasurable consequences socially and to our criminal justice 
system.  Allowing a defendant to receive any benefit for the violence 
he perpetrates against another, based solely on the victim’s LGBT 
status or perceived status, worsens implicit bias of jurors and further 
implies that LGBT persons’ lives are less valuable.  Banning the use 
of the gay panic defense should not be considered a radical move, one 
that diminishes defendants’ rights or narrows tactical advantages at 
trial, but rather a method of allowing our laws and protections to 
progress with society’s evolving and accepting attitudes toward LGBT 
people. 
The gay panic defense has survived decades, evolving over the 
years through improper and prejudicial litigation techniques rooted in 
homophobia.36  The defense has grown out of “ideological fictions 
[that] work to support this prejudicial legal doctrine.”37  The first 
known use of the gay panic defense was the California case People v. 
Rodriguez,38 where the defendant argued that he had been touched 
sexually by the victim while urinating in an alley.39  
In Rodriguez, the defendant beat to death an elderly man with 
a tree branch after following him into his yard where he was emptying 
his garbage.40  The defendant argued a different version of the case, 
that after his friends had stolen a woman’s purse, he ran to urinate in 
an alley when he was grabbed by the victim from behind.41  Fearing 
 
36 Perkiss, supra note 10, at 797 (discussing the transition from the defense’s roots in 
medical science to a contemporary legal defense). 
37 Casey Charles, Panic in the Project: Critical Queer Studies and the Matthew Shepard 
Murder, 18 LAW & LITERATURE 225, 230 (2006). 
38 People v. Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1967). 
39 Perkiss, supra note 10, at 797 (citing Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1967)). 
40 See supra note 38. 
41 Rodriguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 255. 
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the man was “trying to engage in a homosexual act,” the defendant 
picked up the branch and fatally beat the victim over the head.42 
The inconsistencies in the story the defense told were striking 
at trial.  An expert testified at trial that the defendant was not acting 
under “acute homosexual panic,” but was sane when he committed the 
murder.43  The defendant was charged with murder in the first degree; 
however, the jury returned a guilty verdict for murder in the second 
degree because the gay panic defense had successfully mitigated the 
defendant’s actions.44  This case opened the door for use of the gay 
panic defense as a mitigating factor for defendants’ violent actions.45  
Although the expert physician provided testimony as to the 
defendant’s sanity, which the jury accepted, the fear-based nature of 
the defendant’s alleged account of being touched while urinating 
ultimately led to a reduced conviction.  Although the facts 
demonstrated the prosecutor’s account of the incident, and evidence 
contradicting the defendant’s was persuasive, the defense worked and 
the jury empathized with the defendant. 
The consequences of the legal doctrine effectively established 
by Rodriguez have been amplified and carried into contemporary 
criminal proceedings.  The gay panic defense is successful, not because 
the nation supports violence or murder, but rather because of the 
enduring societal intolerance for LGBT people.  Today, reports show 
that overall acceptance of same-sex relationships is at an all-time high, 
with 75% of people claiming same-sex relations “should be legal” and 




44 Id. at 254.  See also supra note 32 (the defendant successfully mitigated his crime through 
the assertion that he was in some way provoked or under extreme emotional disturbance 
stemming from the victim’s sexuality). 
45 The mitigating factor is a topic of the law, which can have potentially impressive 
implications on a defendant’s case, most particularly with regard to sentencing.  Mitigating 
factors are typically used in sentencing when “the severity of the punishment necessarily 
depends on the culpability of the offender.”  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002).  Put 
differently, when a defendant’s actions may be explained or to some degree justified, this is 
cause for consideration in sentencing and rulings by the judge.  Mitigating factors are even 
statutory to a certain degree in most states.  New York, for example, includes a catchall 
provision in the mitigating factor statute stating that a mitigating factor may include anything 
“concerning the crime, the defendant’s state of mind or condition at the time of the crime, or 
the defendant’s character, background or record that would be relevant to mitigation or 
punishment for the crime.”  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(9)(f) (McKinney 2018). 
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acceptable.”46  However, the support revealed by such national polls is 
not uniform because such support drastically varies throughout 
regions, states and localities.47  LGBT sentiment differs 
geographically, adding a layer of complexity in discerning true public 
support or opposition.48  Additionally, given that these polls are self-
reporting, they can fail to report true sentiment, and instead may reveal 
“an increasing reluctance to admit bias against queerfolk.”49 
The defense attorney in one of the benchmark gay panic 
defense cases out of Illinois described the not guilty verdict as “anti-
rape” rather than anti-gay, in a manner consistent with arguments of 
most gay panic defense ban opponents.50  Defendant Joseph 
Biedermann walked free after being acquitted of first degree murder 
for stabbing his neighbor, Terrance Hauser, over sixty times.51  The 
incident occurred in March of 2008, when the two men left a local 
tavern for Hauser’s apartment after Biedermann became too 
intoxicated and a bartender refused to serve Biedermann any more 
alcohol.52  Biedermann testified that the two continued to drink at 
Hauser’s apartment where they eventually passed out.53  When he 
woke up, Biedermann claimed, Hauser was on top of him with a sword 
at his neck, demanding that Biedermann undress and engage in sexual 
acts.54  Thereafter, Biedermann admitted to using a dagger to stab 
Hauser in order to escape.55  At trial, prosecutors asserted that 
Biedermann was far larger and less intoxicated than his victim, and 
that stabbing Hauser dozens of times clearly was unnecessary.56 
Despite the extreme violence, and the “bloody overkill,” the 
defendant was, shockingly, acquitted based on the notion that 
 
46 Gay and Lesbian Rights, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-
rights.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
47 Chan Tov McNamarah, Sexuality on Trial: Expanding Pena-Rodriguez to Combat Juror 
Queerphobia, 17 DUKEMINIER AWARDS J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION & GENDER IDENTITY L. 393, 
397-99 (2018). 
48 Id. at 397. 
49 Id. at 397-98 (emphasis added). 
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“homosexual overtures are themselves sufficient provocation for acts 
of extreme violence.”57  The political director of Equality Illinois 
claimed that the verdict was based “not on the facts but on deep seated 
anti-gay sentiment.”58 
III. A DEEPLY ROOTED LGBT BIAS IN THE LAW 
Persecution of gays in the United States has existed since its 
colonial days.59  In fact, in 1776 at the birth of the nation, gay male 
conduct was punishable by death in each of the thirteen colonies, 
pursuant to borrowed English law.60  However, the late eighteenth 
century marked the start of a period of enlightenment, exploration and 
experimentation in the United States that is often unrecognized today.61  
Prior to World War II, a “gay world” thrived, especially in the New 
York metropolitan area.62  This is a history somewhat buried beneath 
contemporaneous stories of two world wars, a volatile economy, and 
widespread national paranoia.  As the nation’s general fear of outsiders 
grew, so too did its intolerance for those who would be regarded as 
“others” at home.  As George Chauncey noted,  
A battery of laws criminalized not only gay men’s 
narrowly “sexual” behavior, but also their association 
with one another, their cultural styles, and their efforts 
to organize and speak on their own behalf. Their social 
marginalization gave the police and popular vigilantes 
even broader informal authority to harass them; anyone 
discovered to be homosexual was threatened with loss 
of livelihood and loss of social respect. Hundreds of 
men were arrested each year in New York City alone 
for violating such laws.63  
As anti-gay sentiment grew in the first half of the twentieth 




59 Louis Crompton, Homosexuals and the Death Penalty in Colonial America, 1 J. 
HOMOSEXUALITY 277, 277 (1976). 
60 Id. 
61 GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, CULTURE AND THE MAKING OF THE GAY 
MALE WORLD 1890-1940, at 1 (1994). 
62 Id. at 1-2. 
63 Id. 
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enforcement of sodomy laws, many states engaged in “witch hunts” of 
gay men, which served as a legal method of criminalizing “gay 
conduct.”64  Such targeted laws were upheld by the nation’s highest 
court in the landmark case, Bowers v. Hardwick,65 in which the Court 
upheld a Georgia statute forbidding sodomy.66  The respondent argued 
that the statute criminalizing sodomy violated his constitutional rights 
to privacy and due process.67  Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of 
Georgia, thus validating the sodomy laws of that state and similar anti-
sodomy statutes in other states that were used to criminalize gay men’s 
conduct across the country.  The Court in Bowers reasoned in terms of 
morality, that it was not moved by the argument that the perceived 
immorality of gay conduct was insufficient to justify the anti-sodomy 
law, that in fact it was sufficient.68  The Court further supported its 
reasoning that the law “is constantly based on notions of morality, and 
if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated 
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”69 
The issue surrounding the enforcement of sodomy laws would 
not be revisited by the Court until 2003, when it overturned its ruling 
in Bowers with its holding in Lawrence v. Texas.70  In 1998, responding 
to a claim of weapons disturbance, police arrived at the home of John 
Geddes Lawrence (“Lawrence”).71  Upon entering the apartment with 
guns drawn, the police encountered Lawrence engaging in consensual 
 
64 Richard Weinmeyer, The Decriminalization of Sodomy in the United States, 16 AM. MED. 
ASS’N J. ETHICS 916, 916-917 (2014). 
65 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
66 Georgia’s sodomy statute, which particularly targeted gay men, stated the following: 
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits 
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or 
anus of another. A person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy 
when he commits sodomy with force and against the will of the other 
person.  
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by 
imprisonment for not less than one or more than 20 years. A person 
convicted of the offense of aggravated sodomy shall be punished by 
imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more 
than 20 years.  
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984). 
67 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 189. 
68 Id. at 196.  
69 Id. (reasoning that even though morality may have been the sole issue at stake in the case, 
laws are often born from morals, and that to undo such legislation where contrary to the Due 
Process Clause would be incredibly time consuming for the courts). 
70 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
71 Id. at 562-63. 
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sex with Tyron Garner.72  The two men were arrested and taken into 
custody for violating a Texas statute prohibiting “deviate sexual 
intercourse.”73  Lawrence appealed his conviction through the ranks of 
the Texas courts; each court rejected his argument that the statute 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.74  The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the questions 
whether the Texas statue criminalizing the sexual intimacy of same-
sex couples violated the Fourteenth Amendment, namely the provision 
for equal protection of the laws, and whether the convictions for “adult 
consensual sexual intimacy in the home” violated Lawrence’s interests 
in liberty and privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.75 
The Supreme Court held that the Texas sodomy statute that 
formed the basis for the case served “no legitimate state interest which 
can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the 
individual.”76  The Court stated that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment provides individuals the “full right to engage 
in their conduct without intervention of the government,” effectively 
invalidating all state statutes similar to the Texas statute.77  The ruling 
by the Court in Lawrence changed the legal landscape for the LGBT 
community; states were no longer permitted to interfere with the 
personal and private relationships of same-sex couples through the 
enforcement of criminal sodomy statutes.   
Specifically, the Texas statute that landed Lawrence in the 
United States Supreme Court stated, in relevant part, that “[a] person 
commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with 
another individual of the same sex.”78  The conduct the statute 
describes as “deviate” is defined as, “any contact between any part of 
the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another person; or 
. . . the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with 




74 Id. at 563. 
75 Id. at 564. 
76 Id. at 578. 
77 Id. 
78 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003). 
79 Id. § 21.01. 
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ruling in Lawrence, remains on the books in Texas as a lingering 
reminder of the prejudice that sullied the State’s institution of law.80 
Similar to Texas’s unrepealed sodomy statute, anti-sodomy 
laws exist on the books in twelve states, despite the Supreme Court’s 
invalidation of such laws, including: Alabama, Florida, Kansas, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Texas and Utah.81  While some argue that the states’ anti-
sodomy bans remain on the books merely because of the trouble it 
would take to detach consensual sodomy from aggravated sodomy 
(often contained in a single statute), others maintain that it is a 
“reflection of . . . overall homophobia.”82 
Lawrence v. Texas stands as a landmark case in the national 
progression of LGBT rights because of its dramatic implications on 
states’ discriminatory anti-gay practices.83  Society’s understanding, 
tolerance and acceptance of LGBT people have allowed for the 
progression and expansion of LGBT rights in the United States over 
time.  In United States v. Windsor,84 the government appealed a Second 
Circuit decision that the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 1 U.S.C 
§ 7, was unconstitutional.85  DOMA addressed the defining factor of 
marriage and spouses:  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or 
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and wife, 
and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.86 
The conflict in Windsor arose when the United States 
government refused to recognize Edie Windsor and Thea Spyer’s 
marriage for tax purposes following Spyer’s death, despite the fact that 
 
80 Bobby Blanchard, Why Does the Texas Criminal Code Still Ban “Homosexual 
Conduct”?, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 27, 2017),  https://www.texastribune.org/2017/03/27/why-does-
texas-criminal-code-still-ban-homosexual-conduct/. 




83 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
84 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
85 Id. at 2679. 
86 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996). 
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the couple was married in Canada.87  While the couple’s domicile, New 
York, recognized the marriage that took place in Ontario, Canada, Edie 
Windsor was denied her surviving spouse federal estate tax 
exemption.88 
Ultimately, the Court in Windsor upheld the Second Circuit’s 
decision, declaring DOMA unconstitutional based on the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits unequal protection of the 
laws by the federal government.89  In analyzing DOMA’s conflict with 
constitutional protections, the Court noted that “[w]hile the Fifth 
Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade 
or demean in the way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of 
the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all the 
more specific and all the better understood and preserved.”90  The 
Court reasoned that, “[u]nder DOMA, same-sex married couples have 
their lives burdened, by reason of government decree, in visible and 
public ways.  By its great reach, DOMA touches many aspects of 
married and family life, from the mundane to the profound.”91  
Later, when the Supreme Court decided the case for marriage 
equality, Obergefell v. Hodges, it highlighted that the “right of same-
sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the 
Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s 
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”92  Moreover, the Court 
held that maintaining exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage 
“conflicts with a central premise of the right to marry.  Without the 
recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children 
suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”93  The 
Court took, perhaps, its most drastic leap in favor of gay rights in its 
ruling in Obergefell because it provided legal recognition of same-sex 
marriage, acknowledging the need for equality under the laws.   
Although the Court’s decisions in Lawrence, Windsor, and 
Obergefell represent a socially progressive advancement of LGBT 
rights in America, the existence of the gay panic defense is, 
 
87 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2679. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 2695. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 2679. 
92 Id. at 2603. 
93 Id. at 2601-02. 
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nevertheless, another hurdle standing in the way of progress and the 
achievement of equality for the community.  The social, political, 
economic, and judicial impacts of homophobia have had dramatic 
implications on this country for virtually all of its existence.94  
However, evolution of law has slowly, but certainly not universally, 
begun to change the tides.  In New York, the Third Department of the 
Appellate Division recently held that to accuse someone of being gay 
does not rise to the level of defamation per se.95  When a man was 
accused of being gay, he sued the accuser alleging no economic 
damages, but simply that the accusation amounted to defamation per 
se.96  The court held that being called gay is not so damaging as to 
amount to a claim of defamation, and that any decision to that effect is 
“inconsistent with current public policy and should no longer be 
followed.”97  The court in Yonaty v. Mincolla reasoned that: 
In light of the tremendous evolution in social attitudes 
regarding homosexuality . . . and the considerable legal 
protection and respect that the law of this state now 
accords lesbians, gays and bisexuals, it cannot be said 
that current public opinion supports a rule that would 
equate statements imputing homosexuality with 
accusations of serious criminal conduct or insinuations 
that an individual has a loathsome disease.98 
The court recognized the clear shift in society’s tolerance for 
and, furthermore, acceptance of, LGBT persons within its 
communities, rather than as outsiders.  
It is without question that the United States has made 
significant strides in remedying the extreme hardships faced by LGBT 
persons for decades.  As with all social movements in our nation’s 
history, the Gay Rights Movement’s success has not been universal; 
problems persist and the struggle continues.  Despite the public’s 
 
94 HATE IN AMERICA: A TOWN ON FIRE (Peacock Productions 2016). 
95 Yonaty v. Mincolla, 945 N.Y.S.2d 774 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2012); see also Samuel 
Brenner, “Negro Blood in His Veins”: The Development and Disappearance of the Doctrine 
of Defamation Per Se By Radical Misidentification in the American South, 50 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 333, 340 (2010) (describing the fact that historically, common law courts have 
recognized specific categories of defamation, which are considered defamation per se, or “by 
itself,” among these were specifically: representations of criminal conduct, sexual misconduct, 
loathsome disease, or negative representations affecting one’s business, or profession). 
96 Yonaty, 945 N.Y.S.2d at 776. 
97 Id. at 777. 
98 Id. at 778-79. 
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evolving views toward LGBT persons, and the law’s reluctant push in 
the same direction, gay and transgender individuals continue facing 
violence at disproportionately higher rates than any other group of 
people.99  In comparing the rates of hate crimes committed against 
historically persecuted groups in the United States, LGBT people 
today exceed in the numbers by leaps and bounds.100  Furthermore, the 
gay panic defense perpetuates the continued violence against LGBT 
persons by allowing a perpetrator to mitigate punishment, or avoid it 
entirely, solely on the basis of his or her victim’s actual or perceived 
sexual orientation or gender identity.101 
The discussion of the gay panic defense calls into question hate 
crimes and how the differing logic behind the two can be squared, if at 
all.  Where, on one hand we have hate crime legislation throughout the 
country which protects classes of individuals, thus making the identity 
of the individual the very fact to be considered central; on the other 
hand, we have the proposed ban on gay panic defenses, which asserts 
that the violent defendant should not be able to introduce a victim’s 
gender identity or sexual orientation.  The contradiction is clear, we 
are seemingly aiming to pick and choose when and where it may be 
convenient to introduce the identity information of a victim, but the 
logic is not flawed as it may appear at first glance.  In hate crimes, the 
focus on identity is to “specify the nature of the crime,” whereas, 
asserting the gay panic defense uses identity to mitigate the offense.102  
It would be impossible to identify a hate crime without mention of the 
classification, whereas it is entirely possible to assert a defense without 
the use of the gender or sexual identity of the victim. 
 
99 JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 2 (2011), https://www.ncgs.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/11/Injustice-at-Every-Turn-A-Report-of-the-National-Transgender-Discrimination-
Survey.pdf. 
100 See Haeyoun Park & Iaryna Mykhyalyshyn, L.G.B.T. People Are More Likely to Be 
Targets of Hate Crimes Than Any Other Minority Group, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/06/16/us/hate-crimes-against-lgbt.html 
(“L.G.B.T. people are twice as likely to be targeted as African-Americans, and the rate of hate 
crimes against them has surpassed that of crimes against Jews.”); see also Tim Fitzsimons, 
Anti-LGBTQ Hate Crimes Rose 3 Percent in ‘17, FBI Finds, NBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2018, 11:58 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/anti-lgbtq-hate-crimes-rose-3-percent-17-
fbi-finds-n936166 (explaining that 60 percent of over 1,200 separate incidents targeted gay 
men). 
101 WOODS ET AL., supra note 9. 
102 Interview with Professor Jeremy Wisnewski, Professor of Philosophy and Logic, 
Hartwick College, Oneonta, New York (Mar. 13, 2019). 
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To explore the logic, let us look to a racial analogy. It 
is unlikely that a jury would find that a person being 
black is sufficient reason to attack them, or even that 
their “blackness” struck fear in them. If, in the broader 
scheme of this all, “gayness” and blackness have the 
same status then, “that same reasoning should apply in 
defenses as well as hate crime identification. If sexual 
orientation and race are protected under hate crime law, 
the same reasoning demands that we include race and 
sex as likewise analogous when we consider defenses 
based on one or the other.”103 
As a society, we readily decline to allow racial or religious bias to serve 
as a defense to criminal acts, and sexual orientation and gender are 
seemingly no different under the circumstances.  According to 
Professor Wisnewski, “the logic of similarity should rule the treatment 
of similar cases.”104  As it appears, the logic was sound to the 
lawmakers of several states, who have successfully implemented some 
version of the ban. 
IV. THE GAY PANIC DEFENSE: PERMISSIVE VICTIM BLAMING 
The gay panic defense is a method of shifting attention from 
the crime committed by the defendant to the victim.  This “legal 
strategy which asks a jury to find that a victim’s sexual orientation or 
gender identity is to blame for the defendant’s violent reaction,” 
effectively shifts the defense from the defendant to the victim’s 
character or personal identity.105  Such shift in focus in criminal trials 
is not a new phenomenon nor one isolated to the context of this 
defense.  It is a “devaluing act where the victim of a crime, accident, 
or any type of abusive maltreatment is held as wholly or partially 
responsible for the wrongful conduct committed against them.”106 
Courts and legislators have become increasingly aware of 




105 Supra note 8. 
106 Victim Blaming Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL.COM, https://definitions.uslegal.co 
m/v/victim-blaming/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). 
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defense techniques.107  In the context of rape cases, attempts to place 
blame on the victim often fail because of strictly enforced limitations 
on admissible evidence through application of rape shield laws.108  The 
laws protect victims of sexual crimes from being subjected to 
questioning regarding their sexual history.109  The idea behind rape 
shield laws is to encourage victims to come forward, rather than living 
in silence, and mitigate likely biases of jurors who are “unduly 
influenced and prejudiced” by hearing the details of a victim’s intimate 
past.110  
In Burton v. State,111 the court noted that “[a]rguments which 
are calculated to appeal to the jury’s prejudice or passion are improper 
because they pose a risk that the accused may be convicted for reasons 
wholly irrelevant to his guilt or innocence.”112  In Burton, the defendant 
appealed a conviction for a sex crime against a minor.113  The 
defendant argued that, during trial, the prosecutor made improper 
arguments that impacted the jury’s perception of him morally, that the 
verdict was based on the values and emotions of the jurors rather than 
the facts of the case.114  The court held that the prosecutor’s argument 
was “not an improper appeal to community sentiment.”115  The 
defendant’s argument rested upon the notion that, because of the 
prosecutor’s inflammatory remarks, used solely to invoke the passions 
of the jury, he was convicted, not because of the evidence presented or 
the prosecutor’s case.116  The reasoning of that appeal is precisely what 
makes the gay panic defense work, improper and prejudicial pleas to 
biased jurors who feel more offended by the notion of gayness than 
violence or murder.  While the Burton case is unassociated with the 
LGBT community and its efforts, the defendant’s argument reflects the 
 
107 Anne M. Coughlin, Interrogation Stories, 95 VA. L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2009) (“In recent 
decades, legislators across the country have moved to eliminate victim-blaming elements from 
the law . . . to sharply limit the use of victim-blaming as the forensic tactic-of-choice for 
lawyers.”). 
108 See FED. R. EVID. 412. 
109 Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating Search 
for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 990 (2008). 
110 Id. 
111 46 P.3d 309 (Wyo. 2002). 
112 Id. at 314. 
113 Id. at 309. 
114 Id. at 314-15. 
115 Id. at 315. 
116 Id. at 309. 
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manner in which jurors’ passions may be capitalized to bring a guilty 
verdict based on emotion and bias, rather than evidence, fact and law. 
Critics of both rape shield laws and gay panic defense bans 
argue that defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights are impeded by such 
limitations.117  However, it is well-established that these Sixth 
Amendment protections have limits, and the invocation of such rights 
cannot “automatically and invariably outweigh countervailing public 
interests.”118  Above all, our judicial system rests upon a foundation of 
“fair and efficient administration of justice.”119  It is paramount that, in 
achieving justice, the victims’ rights are brought into consideration; 
whether information may or may not be admissible depends on the 
“potential prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial 
process [that] must also weigh in the balance.”120 
To allow a victim’s sexual or gender identity to have any 
bearing on the crime committed against him or her is synonymous with 
the concept of victim-blaming; that the victim’s identity or status is 
what caused the violence, rather than the defendant’s own choices or 
impulses.  It is to say, had the victim not been gay, he would not have 
been murdered.  The focus in the criminal trial must be the facts of the 
case as to the accused, who is on trial, not the victim’s sexual 
orientation or gender identity.  Thus, gay panic defense bans should be 
universally implemented to protect LGBT victims in the same way that 
rape shield laws protect victims of sexual assault.  Aside from the 
defense being antithetical to current social acceptance of the LGBT 
community, the gay panic defense is rooted in outdated victim-blaming 
exercises; it is a flawed, pervasive technique that has no place in our 
justice system. 
 
117 U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defense. 
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V. CURRENT AND PENDING BANS 
What this Note proposes is hardly impractical or impossible: 
states must proactively put an end to the use of the gay panic defense 
because of its detrimental impact on the legitimate function of the 
criminal justice system.  The failure of the vast majority of states to 
enact legislation prohibiting gay panic defenses reflects uneasiness 
with adapting the law to the progressive evolution of our society.121  
Such legislation is feasible and possible as demonstrated by the 
legislation enacted in California, Illinois and Rhode Island which bans 
the gay panic defense. 
A. California 
In 2014, California became the first state to ban use of the gay 
panic defense in criminal proceedings, proposing, in its bill to amend 
the Penal Code: 
For purposes of determining sudden quarrel or heat of 
passion . . . the provocation was not objectively 
reasonable if it resulted from the discovery of, 
knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim’s 
actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender 
expression, or sexual orientation, including under 
circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted 
nonforcible romantic or sexual advance towards the 
 
121 See E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
38, 40 (1985) (describing the theories of legal evolution). 
The “social” approach to legal evolution . . . is characterized by the 
assertion that law is not an autonomous system, but an integral part of the 
social life of a community. In these theories, it is not so much the law that 
evolves, as it is society. As the language, culture, political system, and 
economic structure of society evolve, the law changes with them. 
See also Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, And The Regulation of Conflicts of 
Interest in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y & ETHICS J. 793, 795 (2006) 
(describing the intricate relationship between law and society). 
[L]aw must support social life . . . when existing law fails to do so, the 
rules (and occasionally the concepts) of law change in order to furnish this 
support. Changes in law . . . occur because the evolution of law cannot be 
divorced from, but must reflect, the evolution of society. 
Id. 
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defendant, or if the defendant and victim dated or had a 
romantic or sexual relationship.122  
The bill limits a defendant’s ability to assert provocation as a 
defense for murder in reaction to a romantic attempt or interaction by 
a member of the same sex under the laws of the state.  Similar to the 
way rape shield laws protect victims of sexual crimes in criminal trials 
by limiting the defendant’s admission of the victim’s sexual history, 
the gay panic defense ban precludes a defendant from introducing a 
victim’s sexual or gender identity in precisely the same manner.123 
Ultimately, the gay panic defense ban that remains in effect 
today in California was likely made possible by an earlier act, The 
Gwen Araujo Justice for Victims Act, which preceded the current law 
by eight years having been enacted in 2006.124  The Act was named in 
memory of a murder victim whose perpetrators attempted to employ 
the panic defense, asserting that their discovery that the victim was 
transgender instigated their homicidal reaction.125  It sets forth gender 
and sexual orientation as protected categories under hate crimes and 
aimed to curtail defendants’ abilities to “play upon bias in attempting 
to win acquittal or to seek a lesser charge.”126 
The Legislature expressed concerns with the use of “panic 
strategies” in defense of violent crimes and the notion of jurors 
acquitting violent defendants because of bias.  The bill introduced a 
jury charge, available at a party’s request: 
Do not let bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion 
influence your decision. Bias includes bias against the 
victim or victims, witnesses, or defendant based upon 
his or her disability, gender, nationality, race or 
ethnicity, religion, gender identity, or sexual 
orientation.127 
 
122 Assemb. B. 2501, ch. 684 (Cal. 2014) (emphasis added), amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 
192. 
123 Analogous to admission of rape victim’s sexual past, the gay panic defense similarly 
makes little sense.  If, for example a man murdered a woman, he could never defend himself 
by asserting that she was wildly promiscuous or that her non-violent sexuality struck panic in 
him.  The two are logically parallel to one another. 
124 Assemb. B. 1160, ch. 550 (Cal. 2006). 
125 Gwen Araujo and the Justice for Victims Act, TRANSGENDER L. CTR. (June 9, 2010), 
https://transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/339. 
126 Assemb. B. 1160, supra note 124. 
127 See supra note 121. 
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The law that remains on the books today128 constricts a 
defendant’s tactical abilities by precluding any defense of provocation 
based upon actual or perceived gender identity or sexual orientation.129  
The ban was made possible, in part, with support from organizations 
such as Equality California, which argued that the bill would make it 
clear “that [violence] is never acceptable, and that there is no place for 
prejudice against people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, or 
transgender.”130  The gay panic defense ban officially became law in 
2014, despite arguments by California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
that the ban “undermines core principles of the theory of 
manslaughter” by doing away with the reduction in crime from murder 
to manslaughter, a lesser charge, where the defendant kills as a result 
of provocation or “intense emotion.”131  In accordance with 
jurisprudence’s progression with societal values, the law rejects the 
notion that one’s differing sexual orientation or gender identity is cause 
for concern or panic resulting in a violent outburst.  California’s gay 
panic defense ban, however, when compared to that of the two 
subsequent states to follow its lead, falls short in terms of the protection 
it offers, in that it is too narrowly defined and does not account for all 
of the ways in which defendants can assert the gay panic defense.  
Focused only on instances in which the defendant asserts a provocation 
defense, the ban fails to address the possibility of the defendant’s 
asserting some form of the gay panic defense through another means, 
namely insanity/diminished capacity, or self-defense. 
B. Illinois 
Illinois followed California’s lead, introducing two new 
provisions that limit the use of the defense: 
Provided, however, that an action that does not 
otherwise mitigate first degree murder cannot qualify 
as a mitigating factor for first degree murder because of 
the discovery, knowledge, or disclosure of the victim’s 
sexual orientation.132  
 
128 See supra note 122. 
129 See supra note 119. 
130 Assemb. B. 1160, supra note 124. 
131 Id. 
132 S.B. 1761, 100th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2017). 
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Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an 
intense passion in a reasonable person provided, 
however, that an action that does not otherwise 
constitute serious provocation cannot qualify as serious 
provocation because of the discovery, knowledge, or 
disclosure of the victim’s sexual orientation.133 
Illinois’ statute essentially states that the discovery of a 
victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity may not suffice for an 
assertion of the provocation defense and, more broadly, that any 
attempt to mitigate the crime of murder will fail if based solely upon 
similar discovery.  With support from various public interest 
organizations and civil rights groups, the bill passed unanimously in 
both the State House and Senate and was subsequently signed into law 
by the Governor.134  Illinois’ law follows California’s in that it 
prohibits provocation as a defense because of a victim’s actual or 
perceived sexual orientation or gender identity, but the law has a 
broader scope than California’s.  In addition to prohibiting the use of 
provocation under such circumstances, Illinois also limits a 
defendant’s ability to use the gay panic defense in any capacity to 
mitigate a charge of first degree murder.  The Illinois law says that, 
unless there would be some applicable defense without the gay panic 
element, such a defense may not stand to mitigate the charge of first 
degree murder, constricting the criminal defendant’s ability to escape 
justice for their crime. 
C. Rhode Island 
In July of 2018, the Rhode Island Governor, Gina Raimondo, 
signed House Bill 7066 into law, which in addition to banning use of 
the gay panic defense, wholly amended criminal trial procedure.135 
 [P]rovocation was not objectively reasonable if it 
resulted from the discovery of, knowledge about, or 
potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived 
 
133 Id. 
134 Equality Illinois 2017 LGBTQ Legislative Agenda: Advancing and Defending LGBTQ 
Civil Rights, EQUALITY ILL., https://www.equalityillinois.us/2017-legis/ (last visited Apr. 4, 
2019) (defining the complete agenda as “a package of bills to advance the civil rights 
protections of LGBTQ Illinoisans in the criminal justice system, improve representation on 
public boards and commissions and assist transgender Illinoisans”). 
135 H.B. 7066, ch. 125 (R.I. 2018). 
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gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual 
orientation . . . . A defendant does not suffer from 
reduced mental capacity based solely on the discovery 
or, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the 
victim’s actual or perceived gender, gender identity, 
gender expression, or sexual orientation . . . . A person 
is not justified in using force against another based 
solely on the discovery of, knowledge about, or 
potential disclosure of the victim’s actual or perceived 
gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual 
orientation.136 
Rhode Island is a state that has no record of the defense’s ever 
being used or attempted; however, the sponsors of the legislation 
voiced that the state “must specify that it is an invalid defense to ensure 
that it remains unused.”137  The Rhode Island statute, arguably, is the 
most encompassing law of the three states that have banned the gay 
panic defense.  However, the law did not pass without resistance.138  A 
Republican state representative, Justin Price, expressed concerns that 
such a ban would be harmful because it permits the withholding of 
information (the victim’s sexual orientation or gender identity) from 
the jury and, thus, prevents them from making a sound decision.139  
Nevertheless, Rhode Island’s statute bans the use of the 
“unrecognized” defense under each of the three official defenses 
through which it is typically brought: provocation, self-defense and 
diminished capacity. 
D. Pending Legislation 
Along with California, Illinois, and Rhode Island, similar 
legislation banning use of the gay panic defense is pending in New 
Jersey, Washington, and the District of Columbia.140  Additionally, 
there is a pending federal bill that would prohibit such defenses in 
 
136 Id. 
137 Katherine Gregg, R.I. House Votes to End ‘Gay or Trans’ Panic Defense, PROVIDENCE 
J. (May 22, 2018), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180522/ri-house-votes-to-
end-gay-or-trans-panic-defense. 
138 Christianna Silva, The “Gay Panic” Defense for Murder Could be on Its Way Out, VICE 
NEWS (July 20, 2018), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/ywkp9m/the-gay-panic-defense-
for-murder-could-be-on-its-way-out.  
139 Id.  
140 See supra note 8. 
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federal criminal cases.141  The federal bill, in relevant part, states that 
“no nonviolent sexual advance or perception or belief, even if 
inaccurate, of the gender, gender identity or expression, or sexual 
orientation of an individual may be used to excuse or justify the 
conduct of an individual or mitigate the severity of an offense.”142  This 
proposed legislation would be the broadest of the gay panic defense 
bans, as it widely prohibits the use of gay panic defense tactics on any 
level, for the reasons of excusing or justifying a defendant’s conduct.  
The proposed federal ban would offer the greatest level of protections 
to victims, and could serve as an influential model for the states to 
adopt and follow.  While successfully passing this bill at the federal 
level would eliminate this defense tactic in federal courts, state courts 
would not be bound by the law and state legislatures must act to codify 
their own individual bans.143 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Today, in every state except Rhode Island, Illinois, and 
California, the “gay panic” defense exists as a fully-functional (but 
unofficial) defense for violent crimes in state and federal court.  By 
asserting the gay panic defense, often as an undertone to a defense of 
insanity, diminished capacity or provocation, defendants shift the 
focus of the trial from their crime to the perceived or actual sexual 
orientation or gender identity of the victim.  The defense plays on 
implicit bias and latent homophobia to shield the defendant from 
responsibility due to inaccurate, but existing notions that gay and 
transgender people are innate predators or sexual deviants. 
The defense is an outdated technique that capitalizes on 
lingering bias against the LGBT community by reducing a defendant’s 
perceived culpability or absolving offenders entirely.  It is based on 
notions that LGBT victims are mentally ill, inferior, and frightening, 
despite the medical rejection of such notions and the ever-growing 
social progression contradicting such thought.  Yet, the gay panic 
defense continues to insult the integrity of the criminal justice system.  
 
141 Gay and Trans Panic Defense Prohibition Act of 2018, H.R. 6358, 125th Cong. (2018). 
142 Id. 
143 This is to say that at the federal level, as of this writing, the gay panic defense remains a 
permissible means through which to defend a case, and individual state bans have no bearing 
whatsoever on the defenses as used in federal courts proceedings.  Similarly, the proposed 
federal legislation would impact only cases appearing in federal courts. 
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Furthermore, the admissibility of the defense harms LGBT people in 
the very forum in which they, as victims, should be able to seek justice 
and protection. 
The fact is, defenses based on the discovery of a victim’s 
minority status are rarely given validity in courts of law, but the 
defense of gay panic has been allowed to disrupt our judicial system.  
A defendant’s discovery that his victim was Muslim, or Jewish, or 
Hispanic, or poor would never serve as a defense through which a 
defendant would evade justice and walk free. 
Victims of violent crimes deserve justice; however, the gay 
panic defense often re-victimizes them and allows offenders to receive 
reduced convictions and sentences based on the victim’s sexual 
orientation or gender identity.  Modern society has progressed to a 
point where it is absurd to hinder our justice system because of an 
obstacle rooted in aversion and fear of gay and transgender citizens.  
To prohibit the defense would be a proactive effort by state legislators 
that ought to be inspired by and modeled on the fashion of the three 
states which have passed legislation banning the defense.  The gay 
panic defense is an affront to LGBT people in this country and a 
weakness within the criminal justice system that must be managed by 
states taking the initiative to protect all of its citizens.  As Americans, 
we must remember the observation of Dallin H. Oaks, that 
[O]ur procedures are not the ultimate goals of our legal 
system. Our goals are truth and justice . . . truth and 
justice are ultimate values, so understood by our people, 
and the legal profession will not be worthy of public 
respect and loyalty if we allow our attention to be 
diverted from these goals.144 
The complexities involved with transitioning our legal system 
to represent our social understandings as modern Americans may be 
arduous, but in order to reach the paramount goal of justice, we must 
remove this blemish that remains. 
 
 
144 Dallin H. Oaks, Ethics, Morality, and Professional Responsibility, 1975 BYU L. REV. 
591, 596, https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.goog 
le.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1039&context=lawreview. 
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